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COVER STORY

FORTIFY
THYSELF
Know
Tennessee’s
Real Property
Rules & Tools
Before Charging
into Boundary
Battles

By Chancellor Telford E. Forgety Jr.,
George W. Kuney
and Devin P. Lyon

“Men would live exceedingly quiet if these two words, mine and
thine, were taken away.”
— Anaxagoras
Tennessee real property was historically partitioned through the
“metes and bounds” system, and many deeds written under this
English vestige still exist throughout the state. Because this type of
land surveying describes parcels using natural geographic landmarks
and other monuments, boundary disputes are a common, and
commonly complex, occurrence. Indeed, many attorneys now regard
boundary-line lawsuits as bothersome or difficult undertakings.
Accordingly, this article provides practitioners with a brief restatement of Tennessee law regarding real property boundary disputes,
with a view toward alleviating such concerns among the bar.
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Jurisdiction and Preliminary
Documentation
By statute, chancery courts have jurisdiction to hear all legal disputes
involving the determination of
boundary lines.1 Before bringing a
boundary dispute to the court’s attention, however, both parties should
perform a title search. Not only is a title
search a potential path to avoiding the
courtroom, the production of a clear
chain of title is a requirement to identify
the proper parties to litigation. Both
plaintiff and defendant should package
their chains of title together, with deeds
in chronological order, and submit them
to the court as exhibits.2
Both parties should also submit a
survey to the court, because the
outcome of almost all boundary actions
will depend upon the surveyors’ findings. The surveys must retrace the steps
taken by the original surveyor as closely
as possible.3 The goal is to determine the
intent of the original surveyor.4 If this
intent can be discovered, courts have
generally treated the survey as controlling by applying the holding in Wood v.
Starko (holding that a concrete marker,
placed in the corner of a tract by the
original surveyor, was the appropriate
marker to determine the boundary).5
Additionally, if the original surveyor
placed markers or utilized natural
monuments to indicate the perimeter of
the tract, these markers are the final
governing objects.6 Even if the calls in
the original survey conflict with the
placement of markers, common law
upholds the markers as the final location
of the boundary.7
However, in Cupp v. Heath (holding
that a new survey was correct in
showing that the defendant incorrectly
encompassed part of plaintiff’s property), the Tennessee Court of Appeals
recently distinguished Starko and
narrowed its holding to only those cases
where the original survey was performed
for a common owner of adjacent parcels
of land.8 The court was concerned with
the legitimacy of the original survey
because it was only performed for the
owner of one parcel. The landowner
O C T O B E R2 0 1 2

who commissioned the survey described
the property’s boundaries to the
surveyor, and the surveyor did not elicit
a boundary description from the neighboring owner. In the court’s view, this
one-sided description influenced the
surveyor sufficiently to create an erroneous survey. This position was further
strengthened by a subsequent surveyor
who “had no idea” how the original
surveyor determined the boundary in
light of the deed’s text. Therefore, if an
original survey was completed for an
individual who did not own the
adjoining tract, the authority of that
survey is no longer controlling under
Tennessee law.

Determining Boundaries
After the parties present surveys and
chains of title, Tennessee chancery
courts seek the answer to two basic
questions: (1) Where is the true
boundary, and (2) has the true
boundary changed? In determining the
former, “the construction of deeds and
… instruments … and their effect as to
boundaries is a question of law.”9 The
boundaries to which a document refers
are also a question of law.10 “[W]here
those boundaries are located on the face
of the earth,” however, “is a question of
fact.”11 Appellate review of boundary
disputes is generally — as with most
cases — de novo with a presumption of
correctness in favor of the trial court’s
findings of fact.12 However, conclusions
of law enjoy no presumption of correctness and are reviewed de novo at the
appellate level.
Tennessee common law uses a hierarchy of boundary markers when determining the true boundary between
tracts of land. Chancery courts first look
to natural monuments referenced in the
deed for boundary authority, which
include mountains, rivers, streams,
trees, rocks, paths, fords, etc.13 If a
natural monument no longer exists, the
trial court has a duty to attempt to determine its former location.14 If determined, the natural monument’s former
location still serves as the boundary

“The outcome of almost
all boundary actions will
depend upon the surveyors’
findings.”

Continued on page 16
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Boundary Disputes continued from page 15
marker referenced in the deed.15 Courts
and surveyors highly favor the use of
natural monuments because of their reliability — it is significantly more difficult
for an individual to fraudulently move a
mountain than to move an iron
boundary pin. Therefore, the ability to
find natural monuments is often the
dispositive factor in a boundary suit
because these monuments are deemed
more “worthy” in court.
If no natural monuments mark a
boundary, however, courts resort to the
following in order of priority: uncontroverted16 artificial monuments, including
iron pins, stakes, concrete markers,
fences, buildings, etc.; boundaries of
adjacent owners; courses and distances;
and finally acreage or quantity of land,
which may be used for the purpose of
locating and identifying land.17 Subsequent courts have limited the use of artificial monuments as controlling only
when the deed is unclear and requires
interpretation.18 Additionally, “the law
presumes that a course between two
points, such as ‘a stake at the Southern
Railroad’ to ‘a stone at the Old Mill
Road’ is intended to be a straight line.”19
Fences that divide property are given
careful attention in the law. The general
rule provides that a fence may serve as a
monument when specifically noted in a
deed. However, a fence that is neither
referenced as a monument in a deed nor
erected to conform to a surveyed line
will not be treated as an artificial monument.20 For a fence to be considered a
boundary, the relevant parties must
intend for the fence to establish a
boundary as opposed to simply a
barrier.21 If parties agree to place a fence
as a practical barrier, the fence is not a
boundary marker because there is no
proof that the fence is meant to mark the
boundary line.22 Often, for example, one
party builds a barrier fence without
direct consultation with a neighboring
party. In those cases, evidence of an
agreement is unavailable.
A more common occurrence is for a
party to construct a fence inside a
16 |
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boundary line. This situation frequently
arises due to local ordinances that
require a set distance between fences
and boundary lines to prevent disputes.
In other cases, property owners build
fences inside boundaries as a discretionary tactic to avoid conflicts with
neighbors. In either case, if a party
constructs a fence inside the true
boundary of a tract of land, nothing
prevents that party from claiming the

“Courts and surveyors
highly favor the use of
natural monuments because
of their reliability —
it is significantly more
difficult for an individual to
fraudulently move a
mountain than to move
an iron boundary pin.”
land beyond the fence up to the true
boundary.23
The final noteworthy element in
determining true boundaries is the
assessment of boundaries involving
rivers and streams. Property rights differ
depending on whether the river or
stream is navigable. In a legal sense to be
“navigable” means that the waterway
“must, in its ordinary state, be capable of
and suited to navigation by vessels
employed in the ordinary purposes of
commerce.”24 Owners of land with a
boundary on a navigable stream own the
land only to the ordinary low-water
mark of the stream and not to the
centerline or “thread” of the stream.25
The title to the streambed remains in the
state’s possession for public use.26
Owners of land with a boundary on a
non-navigable stream, however, enjoy
ownership that extends to the centerline
or thread of the stream, and the state

does not retain title to the streambed.27
Despite a non-navigable determination,
the private ownership of a waterway is
still limited under Tennessee law. The
general public retains “a right to the free
and uninterrupted use and enjoyment of
such [waterway] for all the purposes of
transportation and navigation to which
it is naturally adopted.”28
Whether a river or stream is navigable is a question of fact that can only
be determined by a judge or jury.29
Though federal law grants the Army
Corps of Engineers the power to determine the navigability of waterways, the
Corps’s determinations are not binding
on federal or Tennessee courts.30
Instead, the Corps’s determinations are
given “substantial weight,” which allows
a party to submit contrary evidence and
to question the Corps’s procedures and
ultimate conclusion.31
With respect to proof of boundaries,
the Tennessee Rules of Evidence provide
hearsay exceptions for statements in
recorded documents, ancient documents
(at least 30 years old), and community
reputation regarding boundaries where
the reputation arose before the controversy and existed for 30 years.32 Moreover, declarations of previous owners,
made while in possession, are also
admissible.33

Change of Boundaries
To answer the second basic question in
boundary litigation (whether the true
boundary has changed), courts look to
five actions common to neighboring
parties: oral agreement, estoppel, practical location, extended acquiescence,
and adverse possession.

Oral Agreement
The parties may establish a boundary by
oral agreement. An oral agreement may
authoritatively establish a boundary
where, prior to the agreement, (1) there
is uncertainty or dispute regarding the
boundary; (2) the parties or their predecessors agree; (3) the boundary as estabContinued on page 18
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Find people worthy of the
name on the door. That was
my mentor’s advice. But the
landscape has changed over
the last few years. Profits
are harder earned and have
to be more wisely spent.
So I’m getting help to ensure
we’re always healthy enough
to attract and retain top
talent. After all, it might as
well be my name on the door.
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Boundary Disputes continued from page 16
lished is definite; and (4) there is
possession and use of the land up to the
boundary, or acquiescence in the
boundary.34 The agreement may be
shown by circumstances and recognition as well as direct evidence of formal
agreement.35
For example, in Jack v. Dillehay
(holding that an oral boundary agreement existed between predecessor landholders), a surveyor, hired to draw a
plat, discovered that county tax maps
did not match the landowners’ muniments of title regarding the location of
the boundary between their properties.36 The surveyor arranged a meeting
with the landowners to discuss the
boundary discrepancy and came to an
oral agreement that established the
boundary’s location. The surveyor drew
the plat based on this agreement. Subsequent owners improved the property in
question and engaged in activities
throughout the contested area, none of
which were ever challenged by
adjoining owners until twenty years had
passed. At trial, the surveyor and plaintiff testified that there was uncertainty
regarding the boundary drawn on the
county tax maps. The surveyor and
subsequent owners of both properties
also testified that there was an oral
agreement between the original owners.
Therefore, on appeal, the Dillehay court
upheld the boundary created through
oral agreement.37

Estoppel
A boundary may be established by
estoppel, where an owner conducts a
survey and then recognizes and adopts
the boundary it establishes.38 There are
two frequently cited cases that collaboratively define the common-law stan-

“There are two frequently
cited cases that
collaboratively define the
common-law standard for
‘recognizing and adopting’
a boundary.”

dard for “recognizing and adopting” a
boundary. In Mix v. Miller (holding that
landowners were not estopped from
contesting their deed and relying upon
their neighbors’ deed), neighbors
commissioned two surveyors to separately determine a disputed boundary
marking adjacent tracts.39 The first
survey used the Miller deed while the
second used the Mix deed. The surveys
produced markedly different results.
The Mixes relied on the second survey
to remove timber from the land in question, which led to a lawsuit.
On appeal, the court upheld the
survey that more closely aligned with

the artificial monuments referenced
within the original deed. The trial court
had erroneously held that the challenging landowners were estopped from
contesting the boundary because they
recognized and adopted the original
survey that formed their deed. The court
of appeals found “no evidence”
suggesting that the Mixes ever recognized or adopted the survey, and stated
that the Mixes “repeatedly questioned
the accuracy of [the survey].”40 Accordingly, the appellate court held that the
Mixes were not estopped from challenging the boundary.41
In Douglass v. Rowland (holding that a
chancellor did not err in estopping a
landowner from contesting his own
survey), however, plaintiff landowner
presented defendant neighbor with a
survey and staked boundary, requesting
defendant build a retaining wall between
the two properties to prevent surface
water diversion onto plaintiff’s land.42
After the wall was constructed, the plaintiff discovered that the survey erroneously
omitted a pie-shaped section of land. The
court of appeals upheld the chancery
court’s decision to estop the plaintiff from
challenging his own survey.43
From these two decisions, whether a
landowner “recognizes and adopts” a
boundary established by a survey
hinges on the landowner’s actions. If
the landowner challenges the surveyed
boundary before either party engages
in activities on the land in question,
estoppel does not bar the landowner
from disputing the survey. However, if
the landowner engages in activities on
the disputed land, the owner may be
estopped from challenging the
surveyed boundary.

Practical Location
Third, a boundary may be established
by “practical location,” where a party
has marked a boundary and the same
has been recognized for a long period.44
Again, this may also require some
elements of estoppel.45 This legal
theory is very similar to boundary by
acquiescence because both rely on the
18 |
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landowner’s acquiescence to the
neighbor’s use of the property.
However, the key difference in
boundary by practical location is that it
requires improvement to the land in
question, typically by erecting a fence
or other boundary marker.

Extended Acquiescence and
Adverse Possession
The fourth and fifth means of determining whether a boundary has
changed are closely related, and often
confused, theories: extended acquiescence and adverse possession. Tennessee
law provides that, under certain circumstances, when a landowner permits a
neighbor to use a particular portion of
land and treat the land as a boundary,
the landowner has acquiesced to the
neighbor’s control and ownership of that
land.46 Similarly, if a landowner fails to
contest a neighbor’s use of a particular
portion of land, even if this use occurs
without explicit permission, the
landowner may be found to have acquiesced to the neighbor’s control of the
property. As the Supreme Court
explained in Roane County v. Anderson
County (holding that an act to detach a
portion of Roane County was void and
unconstitutional), “[t]he fact that Roane
County has persistently exercised jurisdiction over this territory, and that
Anderson County has submitted without
an appeal to the Courts [sic] of the
country, becomes a very weighty fact as
evidence of the true line.”47
Establishing a boundary by extended
acquiescence may require some
elements of estoppel; the common law
development of establishing boundaries
by extended acquiescence closely draws
from the concept of equitable estoppel,
or the idea that equity demands that a
party must be denied the ability to assert
a particular claim. In some extended
acquiescence cases, Tennessee courts
have equitably estopped plaintiffs from
asserting their boundary claim when a
neighbor has used the land in question
for many years previous. For example,
in Mynatt v. Smart, the Court of
Chancery Appeals estopped the plaintiff
O C T O B E R2 0 1 2

landowner from asserting that his property extended past a line fence when
multiple neighbors had treated the fence
as the true boundary for sixteen years.48
There was also evidence of an oral
boundary agreement.49
In contrast, adverse possession occurs
when an individual obtains control over
or title to the original landowner’s property.50 The difference between the two
theories is that with extended acquiescence, a landowner has knowledge that
another party is using his or her land
and has refrained from objection. In
adverse possession, a landowner may or
may not have knowledge that another
party is using his or her land, and any
objection from the landowner is immaterial — the adverse landholder is
hostile and intends to use the property
regardless of boundaries or ownership.

Adverse Possession
In adverse possession, an individual
receives rights to property by using or

living on the land under a specific set of
criteria. The individual’s possession must
be “(a) actual and exclusive; (b) open,
visible, and notorious; (c) continuous
and peaceable; and (d) hostile and
adverse.”51 There are four statutory types
of adverse possession in Tennessee.
Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-101,
an adverse possessor must establish
three elements: First, the possessor must
have held, for at least seven years, lands
that are traceable to a grant by the State
of Tennessee or the State of North
Carolina.52 Second, the claimant must
hold the land by a conveyance that
purports to convey an estate in fee, i.e.,
the land is held under “color of title.”53
Finally, the claimant must show that the
conveyance was recorded for the full
term of the seven-year statutory period
of adverse possession. If the claimant
succeeds, the statute vests good and
enforceable title.
Similar to section 101, Tenn. Code
Continued on page 20

TENNESSEEBARJOURNAL

| 19

Boundary Disputes continued from page 19
Ann. § 28-2-102 requires seven years of
adverse possession under color of title.
However, this section does not require
deraignment of title back to a land grant.
This statute gives defensive, possessory
rights only — it does not vest title in the
claimant.54 For the claimant to become
vested with actual title, the adverse
possession must continue until the land
has been held for a total of 20 years, and
the claimant can establish common law
adverse possession or “prescription.”55
Notably, under section 28-2-102, the
claimant may receive possessory rights
to the full extent of the property
described in the conveyance that establishes the claimant’s color of title, even if
only a portion of the land has actually
been possessed adversely.56
Section 28-2-103 again requires a
seven-year period of adverse possession,
but does not require color of title. Like
section 102, section 103 gives possessory rights, not title.57 Unlike section
102, however, this section confers rights
only to the extent of the land actually
possessed adversely.
The strongest form of statutory
adverse possession is described in Tenn.
Code Ann. § 28-2-105. This section
shares the same seven-year period of
adverse possession as the others, but
requires that a claimant show color of
title by means of a conveyance to the
actual claimant. The conveyance must
include a description encompassing the
lands adversely possessed, and must
have been recorded for at least 30 years
in the claimant’s color-of-title instrument
or the instruments of the claimant’s predecessors. Like section 101 — and unlike
sections 102 or 103 — this section vests
good title in the claimant.58 Moreover,
the statute confers rights to the full
extent of the lands demised in the instrument establishing the claimant’s color of
title.59 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this is the only type of adverse
possession that runs against the state or
persons under a disability.60
In cases where both parties’ title
descriptions contain the disputed prop20 |
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erty — i.e., where there is an interlap or
interlock — a special rule applies to
adverse possession claims: If the junior
claimant has had possession of a portion
of the disputed property and the senior
claimant has had no possession, then the
junior claimant will prevail to the full
extent of his or her description.
However, if the senior claimant has had
possession of any of the interlock, even
where there is concurrent possession, the
senior claimant will prevail by reason of
superior legal title.61

“The nonpayment of
property taxes can
determine boundary
disputes.”
Prescription (or Common Law
Adverse Possession)
Adverse possession also has a common
law history that is independent of statutory provisions. In Tennessee, “where
one has remained in uninterrupted and
continuous possession of land for 20
years, a grant or deed will
be presumed.”62 As in section 28-2-103,
no color of title is required.63 Also, the
actual, exclusive, open, continuous, and
hostile requirements still remain in
effect.64 The landowner must have actual
knowledge of the adverse possession, or
the possession must be so open and
obvious that there is a presumption of
the landowner’s actual knowledge.65
After the twenty-year time period has
been reached, and if all other criteria are
satisfied, title of the possessed land automatically vests in the adverse
landholder.66

Burden and Standard of Proof
Adverse possession is a question of
fact67 with the burden of proof on the
adverse landholder.68 The claim must be
proven by clear and convincing
evidence.69 Additionally, all evidence is

strictly construed against adverse
possession, and every presumption is in
favor of the holder of the legal title.70

Payment, or Lack of Payment,
of Taxes
Boundaries may also be changed by
determining whether taxes have been
paid on the disputed property. Under
Tenn. Code Ann. 28-2-109, proof that a
landholder has paid the corresponding
property tax for twenty years, and has
also had the deed recorded under the
landholder’s name for twenty years, will
give rise to a presumption that the landholder is the legal owner. However, this
presumption is rebuttable.71 In White v.
Pulaski Elec. Sys. (holding that a trial
judge did not err in granting summary
judgment to the defendant regarding its
land ownership despite plaintiff’s
payment of property taxes), the court
found a preponderance of evidence
showing an erroneous property description, and clear and convincing evidence
that the claimant’s purported title was
invalid.72 Therefore, the court held that,
despite the claimant’s payment of city
and county taxes on the property in
question for more than 20 years, the
claimant could not benefit from the
statutory presumption of ownership.
While property taxes may be dispositive when determining boundary
disputes, the use of tax maps is seldom
helpful. Tax maps are not drawn to
show actual boundary lines. Therefore,
such maps are not admissible for
proving ownership of land.73 Tax maps
are only admissible to “determin[e] who
paid taxes on a particular piece of real
property.”74
Conversely, the nonpayment of property taxes can determine boundary
disputes. Section 28-2-110 of Tenn. Code
Ann. permanently bars a landholder
from bringing an action in law or equity
to clarify title back to the owner if the
owner has failed to pay state and county
taxes on the property for a period
greater than twenty years. Therefore,
presumably, if a landowner fails to pay
O C T O B E R2 0 1 2

property taxes for more than twenty
years but then begins to pay, the
landowner is still barred from filing a
claim to clarify title.
However, in Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc.
v. Shim (holding that a landowner may
bring an action to clarify and reclaim title
if both the landowner and neighbor have
not failed to pay property taxes for a
twenty-year period), the Tennessee
Supreme Court affirmed the creation of a
“contiguous property exception” or
“homeplace exemption” by reversing the
court of appeals.75 Under this exception,
section 28-2-110 will not bar a claim of
adverse possession for the nonpayment of
property taxes “when the tracts are
contiguous, a relatively small area is at
issue, and the adjacent owners making
claims of ownership have paid their
respective real estate taxes.”76 As the court
stated in Cumulus Broadcasting, “To hold
otherwise would effectively eliminate the
adverse possession of any part of an
adjoining tract.”77 This opinion effectively
ended the competing train of thought
that was advocated by the Tennessee
Court of Appeals, which strictly applied
the statute without exception.

Conclusion
In a boundary action, counsel should
focus attention, and tailor proof, toward
the location of the true boundary and
whether the requirements can be met to
prove a change in the boundary. Of
course a party may — and frequently
should — plead in the alternative. The
true boundary will usually be located by
references to monumentation and by
surveys. Whether a change in the
boundary can be proven will depend
upon the requirements of the particular
theory — e.g., oral agreement, estoppel,
adverse possession, etc. These theories
have differing elements and operate
quite differently. Consequently, the practitioner must pay particular attention to
proving the required elements of the
type of claim asserted. While boundary
actions can be complex and difficult,
they need not be the conundrum they
are sometimes perceived to be.
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(Tenn. 1910); see also 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 52 at 459 (1997); Overton, 2007 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 737 at 10.
20. See 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 69 at
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21. 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 90 at 49091 (1997).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The legal definition of “navigable” is
discussed infra at *.
25. State v. Muncie Pulp Co., 104 S.W.437
(1907); Elder v. Burrus, 25 Tn. 358 (1845);
Goodall v. T.L. Herbert and Sons, 8 Tn. App. 265
(Tn. App. 1928).
26. Id.
27. Of course, this general rule does not
apply where a deed only extends a boundary to
the low-water mark of a non-navigable stream.
Webster v. Harris, 69 S.W. 782 (1902).
28. Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. No. 11-75 (citing
The Pointe Ass’n LLC v. Lake Management Inc.,
50 S.W.3d 471, 476 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). See
also Bauman v. Woodlake Partners LLC, 681
S.E.2d 819, 824-25 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). But
see Austa La Vista LLC v. Mariner’s Pointe
Interval Owners Ass’n Inc., 173 S.W.3d 786, 791
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).
29 Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. No. 11-75 (citing
Pierce Hardy, 2001 WL 1216992 at *6).
30. Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. No. 11-75 (citing
33 U.S.C. Part 329 (2011); 33 C.F.R. § 329.3
(2011); Miami Valley Conservancy Dist. v.
Alexander, 629 F.2d 447, 449, 451 (6th Cir.
Continued on page 22
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1982) (cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1123 (1983));
Pierce Hardy, 2001 WL 1216992 at *8).
31. Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. No. 11-75 (citing
Pierce Hardy, 2001 WL 1216992 at *8).
32. Tenn. R. Evid. 803(14), (16), (2011).
33. Montgomery v. Lipscomb, 58 S.W. 306,
307 (Tenn. 1900); Norris v. Cross, 1992 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 886, *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
34. Jack v. Dillehay, 194 S.W.3d 441, 447-48
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Brooks v. Brake,
1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 282, No. 01A01-9508CH-0036, 1996 WL 252322, *5 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 15, 1996)).
35. Franks v. Burks, 688 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1984).
36. See generally Dillehay, 194 S.W.3d 441.
37. Id.
38. Mix v. Miller, 27 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tn.
Ct. App. 1998); Douglas v. Rowland, 540 S.W.2d
252, 256 (Tn. Ct. App. 1976).
39. Mix, 27 S.W.3d at 510.
40. Id. at 514.
41. Id.
42. Douglass, 540 S.W.2d at 254.
43. Id.
44. Galbraith v. Lunsford, 87 Tenn. (3 Pickle)

89, 98–100 (1888).
45. Id.
46. Mynatt v. Smart, 48 S.W. 270, 272
(Tenn. Ch. App. 1898); Roane County v.
Anderson Co., 89 Tenn. (5 Pickle) 259, 267-68
(1890).
47. Roane County, 89 Tenn. (5 Pickle) at 268.
48. Mynatt, 48 S.W. at 272.
49. Id.
50. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-2-101 to 105
(2011).
51. Cumulus Broad. Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d
366, 376 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Ralph E. Boyer,
Survey of the Law of Property 233 & 236 (3d ed.
1981)).
52. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-101 (2012).
53. Color of title requires that the description in the claimant’s title instrument encompass the disputed property. It is a writing that
professes to pass title, but which does not do
so, either for lack of title in the grantor or from
a defective conveyance. Cumulus, 226 S.W.3d at
376 fn.9.
54. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-102 (2012).
55. Gwathney v. Stump, 2 Tenn. 308, 313
(1814); see Ferguson v. Prince, 190 S.W. 548,
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All calls are confidential and free. If you or someone you
know is suffering from stress, anxiety, burn-out, grief, major
life changes, depression and/or substance abuse problems,
call the

552 (Tenn. 1916); Webb v. Harris, 315 S.W.2d
274, 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).
56. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-102 (2012).
57. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-103 (2012).
58. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-105 (2012).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Corrado v. Hickman, 113 S.W.3d 319,
323 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
62. Ferguson v. Prince, 190 S.W. 548, 552
(Tenn. 1916); see also Webb v. Harris, 315
S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).
63. Keel v. Sutton, 219 S.W. 351, 352-53
(Tenn. 1920); Hallmark v. Tidwell, 849 S.W.2d
787, 792-93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
64. Hightower v. Pendergrass, 662 S.W.2d 932,
935 n.2 (Tenn. 1983); cf. Menefee v. Davidson
County, 260 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tenn. 1953).
65. Kirkman v. Brown, 27 S.W. 709, 710
(Tenn. 1894).
66. Cooke v. Smith, 721 S.W.2d 251, 255-56
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
67. Wilson v. Price, 195 S.W.3d 661, 666
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
68. O’Brien v. Waggoner, 96 S.W.2d 170, 176
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).
69. Cumulus Broad., Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d
366, 377 (Tenn. 2007).
70. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 658 S.W.2d
125, 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
71. Corrado v. Hickman, 113 S.W.3d 319,
324 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
72. White v. Pulaski Elec. Sys., 2008 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2008).
73. Whitworth v. Hutchison, 731 S.W.2d 915,
917 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
74. Jack v. Dillehay, 194 S.W.3d 441, 450
(Tn. Ct. App. 2005).
75. Cumulus Broad., Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d
366, 380-81 (Tenn. 2007).
76. Id. at 381.
77. Id.
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Aaron Hall, Attorney at Law
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NURSING HOME LITIGATION:
HOW THE NEW LAWS AND RECENT
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Parke Morris, Morris Carnahan PLC

PRO BONO: MORTGAGE RELIEF FOR
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Jeffrey Hill, Office of Tennessee
Attorney General
Jennifer Peacock, Office of Tennessee
Attorney General

SATURDAY ETHICS PROGRAM 2012:
COFFEE ANYONE?
Justin Brackett, Brackett & Strunk
PLLC
Daniel Ellis, Mostoller, Stulberg, Whitfield and Allen
Brian Faughnan, Thomason, Hendrix,
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THE EEOC'S NEW GUIDANCE ON
THE ADA, ADEA, AND CRIMINAL
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Stacie Caraway, Miller & Martin PLLC
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Tennessee
Bar Association
Video Contest
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

The Importance
of a Fair and
Impartial Judiciary
CONTEST BASICS

THIS YEAR’S CONTEST THEME

Age Groups
Middle school students
(grades 6-8)
High school students
(grades 9-12)
Cash Prizes for
Each Age Group
• First Prize: $500*
• Second Prize: $300
• Third Prize: $200
*$500 also will be provided
to each first-prize sponsoring
school or organization.

In Federalist Paper No. 78, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the judiciary is “the least dangerous”
branch of government because it “has no influence over either the sword or the purse.” A
central principle of our U.S. form of government is that judges should be able to reach decisions
free from political pressures. The framers of our Constitution organized our government so that
judges would have a proper measure of protection from the executive and legislative branches.
This structure allows the court to make fair and impartial judgments in cases free from influence
of the two political branches. We do not have strict majority rule in this country — when the
will of the majority is contrary to individual rights as guaranteed by the Constitution, the role of
the courts is to protect and uphold these rights of the individual.

Submission Deadlines:
Middle school: March 15, 2013
High school: March 29, 2013

LEARN MORE
Contact Sarah Hayman at
shayman@tnbar.org or
(615) 383-7421.
Scan this QR
code to learn
more.

Middle and high school students are invited to participate in the Tennessee Bar Association’s
3rd Annual YouTube Video Contest and create a 3-minute video that explores the issue of a fair
and impartial judiciary. Why is it important to have a judiciary that is independent of the legislative and executive branches? How does this structure strengthen the doctrine of separation of
powers? How high should the walls between the branches be? What happens when judges
aren’t fair or impartial? Considering the powers granted to the three branches and the checks
and balances each branch has over the others, would you agree with Hamilton that the judiciary
is “the least dangerous branch”? Why or why not?
For contest rules and entry form visit http://www.tba.org/programs/the-tba-youtube-video-contest

